Time | Speaker | Title | Resources | |
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09:30 to 10:30 | Debmalya Panigrahi |
Routing in cost-shared networks: equilibria and dynamics This tutorial will discuss how a network administrator/designer can efficiently route traffic from multiple strategic users if the routing cost is shared equally by them. I will talk about both static and dynamic settings, based on whether the set of users is fixed or users can join/leave the network over time. In both settings, I will discuss how the quality of the solution is affected by the degree of control available to the administrator. The first part of the tutorial will illustrate this by showing a sharp distinction between the price of anarchy and the price of stability of the resulting network game. This will lead us to the question of determining which of the corresponding equilibria are attainable via natural game dynamics; this will be our topic of discussion in the second part of the tutorial. The tutorial will touch upon a large body of work in the last 15 years in this area including recent developments, highlighting the main techniques developed and their shortcomings in trying to address the many outstanding questions in this domain. |
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10:30 to 11:00 | -- | Break | ||
11:00 to 12:00 | Debmalya Panigrahi |
Routing in cost-shared networks: equilibria and dynamics This tutorial will discuss how a network administrator/designer can efficiently route traffic from multiple strategic users if the routing cost is shared equally by them. I will talk about both static and dynamic settings, based on whether the set of users is fixed or users can join/leave the network over time. In both settings, I will discuss how the quality of the solution is affected by the degree of control available to the administrator. The first part of the tutorial will illustrate this by showing a sharp distinction between the price of anarchy and the price of stability of the resulting network game. This will lead us to the question of determining which of the corresponding equilibria are attainable via natural game dynamics; this will be our topic of discussion in the second part of the tutorial. The tutorial will touch upon a large body of work in the last 15 years in this area including recent developments, highlighting the main techniques developed and their shortcomings in trying to address the many outstanding questions in this domain. |
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12:00 to 13:30 | -- | Lunch | ||
13:30 to 14:00 | Vishu Guttal | Early warning signals of critical events in complex systems | ||
14:00 to 14:30 | Ramesh Hariharan |
Using Data to Make Genomic Diagnoses A small but not insignificant fraction of individuals suffer from early onset diseases caused by single or few genomic mutations. The task ofidentifying the genomic cause requires sequencing the genome and then analysing the large amount of data that results. What follows can often be confounding in various ways as this talk will illustrate with real examples -- infants who pass away mysteriously, siblings with misplaced organs, a little boy suffering from bone marrow failure, an infant whose blood can’tcarry enough oxygen, and my own colorblindness. Some of these are captured in a book called Genomic Quirks <http://tinyurl.com/genomic-imperfections-book> (http://tinyurl.com/genomic-imperfections-book). |
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14:30 to 15:00 | Prithwish Basu |
Network design games in presence of strategic adversaries I will talk about our recent work on topology design games between a network designer and a strategic adversary. While the designer aims to defend the network or grow it to an optimal topology with respect to a network property, the adversary simultaneously counters and tries to force the designer to operate in a suboptimal topology. I will characterize some key structural properties of the mixed strategy equilibriums of this one-shot game, and then describe the effect of parameters, such as probability of a successful attack, on the topology dynamics in a repeated game setting. I will also describe a multi-stage game in which the designer is not just interested in the instantaneous network property costs but a discounted sum of costs over a period of time; and will examine whether defense/growth strategies here result in better benefits for the designer compared to the strategies resulting from the one-shot game. |
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15:00 to 15:30 | John Augustine |
Random Walks on Dynamic Graphs Random walks are useful in modeling a variety of natural phenomena. Moreover, they have also found wide application as an algorithmic tool. Quite naturally, they have been studied extensively in the context of static graphs. In this talk, we will present recent results from the last five years that have extended random walks theory to dynamic graphs and show how they can be effectively used to solve a variety of algorithmic problems in dynamic networks. |
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15:30 to 16:00 | -- | Break | ||
16:00 to 16:30 | Cris Moore | Turing lectures | ||
16:30 to 17:00 | Cris Moore | Turing lectures |